Standards for Corporate Financial Reporting: Regulatory Competition

Within and Across International Boundaries
Daimler-Benz AG reported a net income of DM168 million under German GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles), and a loss of DM949 million under U.S. GAAP, for the first six months of 1993.
1 This example has often been cited in support of international harmonization of accounting standards. It is likely that by year 2010, publicly-held corporations in a large part of the world may have to prepare their financial reports using a single set of financial standards produced by a single body of standard setters. Monopoly of a single set of accounting standards is already the norm within national economies.
I shall build on previous work 2 to make a case to the contrary: a competitive regulatory regime for accounting standards, within and across national jurisdictions, that allows individual firms to choose from a set of accounting standards, is more efficient. I shall also outline a mechanism for implementing such a regime.
There are several reasons to resist the demand for harmonization or uniformity of accounting standards. First, the metaphor of the firm as a competitor in a vast economic game with the accountant as the scorekeeper sets unrealistic expectations of financial reports. People expect an unambiguous score for corporations, just as they do in a game of soccer. Attempts to explain 1 Broby (1995) .
2 Dye and Sunder (2001) the ambiguity of scores are doomed as prevarication, incompetence, chicanery or worse. Beliefs in unidimensionality and uniqueness of corporate performance are widespread. Accountants should educate the public instead of pandering to ignorance and misunderstanding.
Second, the meaning and import of accounting numbers depend on the economic environment in which a firm operates. Environments of business vary not only across countries but also within economies and industries. Forcing uniformity of financial reporting on firms in different environments focuses on form instead of substance.
Third, while accountants recognize the need for simplicity and comparability to help the non-experts, they also consider the ability of managers to manipulate financial reports to suit their own interests. If financial statements only reported the amount of cash in the till, simplicity would be easy to attain.
Consequences of ignoring the difficult to "count" resources and obligations are often more serious than the consequences of additional complexity.
Fourth, no standard-setting body has information to confidently assess the consequences and relative merits of alternative accounting standards. Continual changes in the business environment make this task even more difficult.
Experimentation with alternatives in a competitive regulatory environment can help identify desirable accounting standards.
Financial reporting jurisdictions across the world have created local monopolies for writing financial reporting standards for publicly held corporations.
In the U.S., for example, the statutory authority over these standards is vested in Dunmore and Falk (1999) for examination of arguments for a competitive regime in auditing. Sunder (1997, Chapters 11-12) .
customize through individual choice. Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) allow such flexibility.
Current Structures
The current structure for setting financial standards in U.S. was set up in 1972 based upon recommendations of the Wheat Commission. The
Commission itself was set up following the difficulties the Accounting Principles
Board, a senior committee of the American Institute of CPAs, had in getting its rulings on accounting for investment tax credit accepted by the industry. The
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) was set up as an independent private body, consisting of seven members drawn from auditing, industry, investment houses and academia, and financed by contributions from business organizations.
Since its establishment, more than three decades ago, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have faced criticism for their unwillingness or inability to write "tough" accounting rules, but also for being unresponsive to the business community. Examples include the FASB's attempts to write standards to account for inflation, oil and gas exploration costs, pension liabilities and equity-based employee compensation. As the only setter of accounting standards in the US, the FASB tries to satisfy all its constituencies, but it is not always possible to do so.
Challenge of Setting Efficient Standards
Diverse legal and market conditions prevail across countries. These differences have been used to defend variations in accounting practices. 6 On the other hand the advantages of uniformity, comparability and harmonization of financial reporting across economies form the basis on which national and international standard-setting bodies are justified. It is difficult to compare the costs and benefits of differentiation and harmonization in financial reporting to arrive at efficient solutions.
Standard-setters need criteria for social choice, and identify the rules that best satisfy the chosen criteria. Both these tasks are complicated by the diversity of interests of affected parties, and the lack of information about the consequences of alternative standards. A competitive standards regime can integrate the relevant information from various sources and use it to set standards in an efficient and incentive-compatible fashion.
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What should be the criteria for selecting financial reporting standards?
Accounting standards affect many agents in society including shareholders, employees, customers, vendors and the government. Pareto criterion for social choice seems least objectionable: If Option A is better than Option B for at least some agents without being worse for any, Option A is rated by this criterion to be superior to Option B. Sunder (1997a Sunder ( , 1999 . There are significant cross-jurisdictional variations in how stock prices behave and how they are associated with accounting and other information. Durnev et al. (2001) , for example show that the proportion of stock return variance explained by stock market-wide variations varies from a high of 57 percent in Poland to a low of 2.3 percent in U.S. during recent years. The synchronicity of accounting and stock market returns also varies considerably across countries (Alford et al., 1993) . 7 See Hayek (1945) . 8 The ranking of options by Pareto criterion is only partial; if Option A is better for some agents and Option B is better for some others, Pareto criterion cannot rank them with respect to each other.
Standard-setters face an information barrier in identifying efficient standards. Standard setters try to discover the consequences of their proposals for various agents through their own analysis, surveys, and solicited comments.
Beyond the direct costs of preparing financial reports, it is difficult to assess the economic consequences of proposed standards. Solicitation of comments often yields strategic responses from those who favor or oppose the proposals for their own reasons, making it difficult to arrive at Pareto efficient solutions.
Given the importance of the role of financial accounting in markets for capital, it is reasonable to choose financial accounting standards on the basis of their effect on lowering the cost of capital for the reporting firms. Cost of capital criterion has several advantages. More informative financial reports increase the knowledge the investors have about the firms, and therefore their confidence in their trading decisions. Lower risk to investors translates into demand for and expectation of a lower rate of return from their investments in the firm. It also means a willingness to pay higher prices for a given security defined as a sequence of cash flows. Given the scale of operations of a firm, it can raise more money from equity and bond investors for its securities. These extra resources become available to various participating agents in the firm. While the division of this extra surplus among agents is matter of their bargaining power and factor market conditions, 9 it is reasonable to expect that accounting standards that lower the cost of capital are Pareto superior to other standards; they make at least some people better off without hurting the interests of others.
9 See Sunder (2001) . Dodd and Leftwich (1980) , and Romano (1998 
Regulatory Competition
In many countries there is only a single statute to govern corporate charters and issue of securities, a single stock exchange, and a single set of standards for financial reporting. Arguments about the value and advantages of competition given above for the U.S. also apply to other countries. Even relatively small countries and economies can reap the benefits of competition. A competitive model of financial reporting will help resolve the standardsetting problem in an incentive-compatible fashion. Various standard-setting bodies will try to set standards which attract as many firms as possible from either a targeted or a universal set of firms. Each standard-setter will have to assess the appeal of its standards to a large number of firms on the basis of their comparability on one hand, and representativeness relative to the peculiar circumstances of the firms' environment on the other. If the IASB, for example, chooses its standards to be close to the standards appropriate for the U.S. market, it would make its own standards more appealing to firms that would like to attract U.S. investors for its securities. On the other hand, issuers with operations in economies that differ structurally from the U.S. in important ways may conclude that the choice of such a standard will make their reports less informative relative to their local circumstances, and therefore less informative to the investors familiar with such circumstances.
Every standard-setter will have to make such delicate judgments and trade-offs about managers' and investors' own decision-making in choosing its reporting rules. Once the accounting rules are issued, the managers and investors will exercise their own choices among the available standards and prepare their reports. If these reports are acceptable to the investors, they will place a higher value on the securities of the firms whose reports are more satisfactory. Investors' willingness to pay a higher price will lower their cost of capital, and benefit the agents who participate in the firm. Managers, watching this investor preference, will then tend to choose to adopt the standards favored by the investors. Managerial action will direct more revenue or reputation and recognition to the favored standard-setting bodies. This revenue or reputation will have an effect of its own on the choices standard-setting bodies make in selecting standards. Botswana (1997) estimated that the cost of capital of firms followed by relatively few analysts is significantly lower if they disclose more information in their annual reports. Botosan and Plumlee (2000) found similar results for larger, more widely followed firms. These estimates suggest that the cost capital related to differences in disclosure policy chosen by the firms within the U.S. GAAP may be in 0.2 to 0.5 percent ranges. They did not assess the cost of capital differences that might be related to measurement standards. Botosan and Plumlee also found that greater and more timely disclosure through publications, other than annual reports, is associated with higher cost of capital. They attribute this result to the possibility that frequent and timely disclosures cause market volatility, raising the cost of capital. Hail (2001) found even stronger results for Swiss companies. These studies suggest that the relationship between financial reporting and cost of capital may be complicated. Experimentation with a variety of reporting systems may be necessary to identify efficient standards.
More strict or detailed standards are not necessarily better standards for all segments of the economy, or for the economy as a whole. This issue emerged as the "Big-GAAP, Small-GAAP" controversy which led the FASB to begin to differentiate some of its standards by the size of firms to which they are applicable. Differences in market development and economic environments of various industries within the U.S. have lead to many industry-specific standards, and to exclusion of some industries from standards framed for general application. No single set of standards have been shown to be the best suited for all firms. Nor is it possible to identify with confidence a set of standards that are best for the economy of a country as a whole. Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to create a mechanism that has a fair chance of arriving at a single or multiple sets of standards to the extent they are found to be efficient through market competition.
The argument for regulatory monopoly in accounting is often based on the assumption that in the absence of such regulation, there will be no standards.
There is a significant amount of evidence to the contrary. The demand for auditing, for example would exist even in the absence of government regulation to require auditing of publicly held firms.
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13 For example, see Simunic and Stein (1987) , Blackwell et al. (1998), and Titman and Trueman (1986) . High quality of audit can be used by higher quality firms as a signal to credibly convey their quality to the
U.S. Versus International GAAP
In order to achieve its growth objectives, the Lisbon Council of European Union's heads of state decided to promote a single, deep, and liquid financial market through adoption and enforcement of a single set of financial reporting standards. Adoption and enforcement of the standards written by the International Accounting Standards Board is under consideration for this purpose. Adoption of a single EU-wide standards is justified by the need to establish and enforce high quality standards for all; to create a level playing field, and to prevent regulatory arbitrage. This conclusion is based on the premise that the global markets "urgently demand" high quality international accounting standards.
The U.S. SEC's call for meeting the challenge of global securities markets will be met through cooperation and adaptation of regulatory regimes within the EU and between the U.S. and the EU. Development of new trading technologies and globalization of markets is said to exert pressure toward convergence of accounting which is sought to be met by the SEC in the U.S. and by the EU through regulatory fiat. The U.S. and EU regulators have debated the relative "quality" of FASB and IASB standards under the presumption that permitting firms to prepare their reports using lower "quality" standards is bad public policy.
In the U.S. SEC has resisted allowing the use of alternatives to U.S.
GAAP by firms whose securities are traded in U.S. markets. In Europe, the EU investors. Such signaling is possible in presence of price premium charged by audit firms, which are perceived to provide services of higher quality (Datar et al., 1991) .
seems to favor the IAS, and uses the following argument to persuade the SEC to allow the use of the IAS in U.S. markets:
Another crucial question for analysts is whether or not the capital markets can operate efficiently in an IAS environment. The view is that they can and do. Clearly, users (including U.S. investment funds) are already using the IAS as the basis for informed investment decisions, and are doing so without having a U.S. GAAP reconciliation (response to Question 5).
Being based on the ability of users to protect their own interests by taking the differences among standards into account, this argument is valid. However, coming from the EU, it would be worth keeping in mind that users (including U.S.
and European investment funds) are already using financial reports prepared utilizing a wide variety of standards, including many that differ substantially from both the FAS and the IAS. When it comes to yielding foreign firms access to European capital markets, the EU should consider its own argument.
An important concern of the U.S. SEC in allowing alternative standards to compete in the U.S. markets is whether such competition may put companies that use more conservative standards at "competitive disadvantage with respect to recognition, measurement or disclosure. (SEC, Q. 6)" This concern is based on the idea of functional fixation-inability of investors to distinguish between appearances and economic reality. The ability of investors to make such distinctions depends on their sophistication and analytical effort. While there is evidence that developed stock markets, significantly populated by sophisticated institutional investors, are quite good at distinguishing appearance from reality, one cannot conclude that no one is ever misled, even when confronted by financial reports based on a single set of standards. Allowing multiple sets of standards will require even greater sophistication on the part of investors, putting investors without the appropriate expertise at a disadvantage. Such disadvantage for the lay investors already exists; it is not peculiar to a regime of competitive accounting standards. In making policy, we must balance any additional disadvantage to the "non-experts" from competitive regime against the advantages of having lower cost access to more investments, and the possibility that competitive standards will be better suited to the needs of the investors, lowering the cost of capital of firms.
Implementing A Competitive Regime
How will compliance with the standards be monitored and enforced under The SEC's oversight for the fairness of financial reports submitted by registrants will continue under the competitive regime. When reports appear to be unfair, the regulators will continue to raise questions with the registrants and their auditors. Unfairness of reports arising from a failure to comply with the chosen reporting or auditing standards will trigger disciplinary action against the registrant or the auditor. When unfairness persists in spite of the conformance of reports to their chosen set of financial standards, the regulators will ask the makers of the rules to address the problem.
While some provinces of Canada allow competitive auditing standards, U.S. auditing standards remain monopolistic. Disciplinary functions for auditors are shared among the government and self-regulatory organizations at federal and state levels. Independent of whether the U.S. adopts a competitive model for auditing standards (see Dunmore and Falk, 1999) , quality assurance through peer review, public oversight and reporting, and disciplinary action for auditors will continue. Security regulators can require an audit by individuals and firms who are subject to an appropriate acceptable oversight and disciplinary regime.
In the U.S., for example, the SEC could require that a registrant who uses IASB standards get its reports audited by auditors subject to a regulatory regime acceptable to the SEC.
Under a competitive regime, a support staff either, at the IOSCO or at the respective standard-setting bodies, could serve and assist national security regulators. This staff would be financed from the revenues gathered from corporations who choose to use the standards of various rule-making bodies.
This staff will supplement the expert resources of national regulators and address any queries from them about the compliance of financial reports of a given registrant.
Concluding Remarks
Jurisdictional choice of accounting standards is an obvious parallel to jurisdictional choice available for corporate charters to U.S. domestic corporations. Choice of incorporating themselves in one of many available jurisdictions is also available to many multinational corporations. This paper argues that making such choices available to corporations worldwide will improve the efficiency of corporate governance and accounting standard setting.
The argument for competitive financial reporting standards is not an argument for eliminating such standards. Instead of lowering the cost of capital, elimination of standards will create anarchy in which the meaning and informativeness of financial reports will be lost. Fortunately, a competitive approach to standardization leaves open the possibility that the corporations and investors, when given a choice among alternatives, will choose less demanding standards that approach a "free for all." It is possible for competition to lead us to a conclusion that no standards are most preferred by investors.
Monopoly regulatory regimes for accounting standards within many national boundaries have helped develop their capital markets and financial reporting over the past seven decades. Globalization of a diverse world economy has led policy makers to push financial reporting in the direction of active harmonization of standards across national boundaries. Harmonization across national boundaries should not necessarily mean extending the national standards monopolies to global scale. Economics, and information and communications technologies indicate that we could do better if we move from monopoly toward competitive accounting regimes, nationally and internationally.
Competition has served us well by developing efficient frameworks in the fields of corporate charters, banking, maritime shipping, and stock exchanges.
At the time of this writing, competition in e-commerce is giving rise to policies, standards and assurance services for privacy on the Internet without help from regulation.
14 Competitive interaction among standard-setters, business firms, and investors across the globe will lead us to better accounting practices and standards, and lower cost of capital.
